Brinztech Alert: New Python Stealer Sold with Chrome “v20” App-Bound Encryption Bypass

Dark Web News Analysis

A threat actor on a known hacker forum is advertising the sale of a newly developed Python-based infostealer, distributed as a compiled EXE file. The tool is explicitly marketed with the capability to bypass Google Chrome’s latest security defense, App-Bound Encryption.

Brinztech Analysis:

• The “v20” Claim: The seller claims to bypass “Chrome v20 encryption.” This refers to the specific v20 prefix Google Chrome (versions 127+) now attaches to cookies encrypted with App-Bound Encryption. This security feature was designed to prevent malware running with user privileges from stealing cookies. The fact that this new, lower-tier Python tool claims to bypass it confirms that high-end evasion techniques have trickled down to the commodity market.
• The “Chromeelevator” Method: The mention of using “Chromeelevator” to achieve this bypass is critical. It likely refers to the abuse of the GoogleChromeElevationService (IElevator) COM interface. Sophisticated malware (like Lumma or Vidar) interacts with this legitimate service to trick it into decrypting the cookies on the malware’s behalf. This Python tool appears to be wrapping that complex technique into a simple, accessible script.
• Capabilities: Beyond Chrome, the tool targets legacy cookies (v10/v11), cryptocurrency wallets (Exodus, Metamask), and session data for Telegram and Steam, making it a comprehensive “identity theft in a box” for entry-level cybercriminals.

Key Cybersecurity Insights

This alleged tool sale represents a significant escalation in the “cat and mouse” game of browser security:

• Commoditization of Advanced Bypasses: Until recently, bypassing App-Bound Encryption required sophisticated, often paid, malware-as-a-service subscriptions (like Lumma or Stealc). This sale suggests that the bypass code has been ported to Python, making it open to modification, obfuscation, and use by less skilled actors.
• Python EXE Threat: Distributing the stealer as a compiled Python EXE (likely using PyInstaller or Nuitka) allows attackers to easily evade signature-based antivirus detection. Python scripts are trivial to obfuscate, meaning unique “builds” of this malware can be generated instantly to bypass static defenses.
• Real-Time Monitoring: The integration with Telegram for exfiltration and notifications transforms this from a passive data logger into a real-time surveillance tool. Attackers can receive 2FA codes or session cookies immediately upon infection, allowing for instant account takeover.

Mitigation Strategies

In response to this claim, organizations must harden their endpoints against Python-based threats:

• Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): Ensure EDR solutions are configured to scan and block unauthorized Python execution, especially compiled EXEs that make calls to the Chrome Elevation Service (COM interface) or attempt to access the Local State file in Chrome directories.
• Browser Security Hardening: While the bypass exists, keeping Chrome updated is still vital. Organizations should also consider Application Control policies that prevent unknown EXEs from launching from user directories (Downloads/AppData), which is the typical execution path for these stealers.
• Session Hygiene: Users should avoid saving passwords in the browser for high-value accounts (Banking, Crypto). Use a dedicated Password Manager instead. Frequent clearing of cookies and active sessions can limit the value of data stolen by such tools.
• User Awareness: Reinforce training on Telegram/Discord-based malware delivery. Many Python stealers are distributed as “game mods,” “cracks,” or “beta software” in chat communities.

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