Shanya EDR Killer: The New “Packer-as-a-Service” Fueling Global Ransomware

Dark Web News Analysis

A potent new threat tool dubbed “Shanya” (operating under the alias “VX Crypt”) has emerged on underground forums, positioning itself as a successor to previous market leaders like HeartCrypt. Sophos researchers have identified Shanya not just as a defensive packer, but as an offensive “EDR Killer” designed to blind endpoint protection platforms (EPP) and clear the path for ransomware.

Brinztech Analysis:

• The Function: Shanya bridges the gap between initial access and final payload deployment. It acts as a “battering ram,” systematically dismantling security software (Anti-Virus/EDR) so that ransomware payloads can run without interruption.
• The Customers: The tool has been linked to high-profile ransomware families, including Akira, Medusa, and Qilin.
• Targeting: While global in scope, recent campaigns have shown a specific prevalence in targeted attacks across the UAE and Tunisia.

Key Cybersecurity Insights

Shanya distinguishes itself through sophisticated kernel-level evasion and “living off the land” tactics:

• BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver): The core of Shanya’s lethality is its use of the “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver” tactic. It drops and exploits legitimate, signed—but vulnerable—drivers (most notably ThrottleStop.sys) to gain kernel-level privileges. This allows it to bypass user-mode restrictions and directly attack the kernel callbacks used by security software.
• DLL Side-Loading via consent.exe: To mask its execution, Shanya often compromises legitimate system binaries. It frequently exploits consent.exe (a Windows UAC binary) to side-load malicious DLLs, making the attack traffic appear to originate from a trusted Microsoft process.
• Anti-Analysis & Evasion:
  • Junk Code: The loader is saturated with useless code to frustrate reverse engineers.
  • Debugger Crashing: It calls RtlDeleteFunctionTable with invalid contexts to actively crash security debuggers.
  • PEB Hiding: Critical configuration data is hidden within the Process Environment Block (PEB), utilizing the GdiHandleBuffer to conceal API pointers from memory scanners.
• “Double Loading” Technique: Shanya employs a unique method where it loads a second instance of a benign system DLL (like shell32.dll) and overwrites its header with the decrypted malicious payload (often using names like mustard64.dll). This allows the malware to exist seamlessly within legitimate memory spaces.

Mitigation Strategies

Defenders must move beyond standard signature detection to stop kernel-level killers like Shanya:

• Block Vulnerable Drivers: Implement the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist (or equivalent via your EDR). Specifically, block known vulnerable versions of ThrottleStop.sys and monitor for the creation of suspicious drivers like hlpdrv.sys.
• Monitor consent.exe Anomalies: Configure SIEM/EDR rules to flag any instance of consent.exe loading unsigned or unexpected DLLs (particularly from non-system directories).
• Enable Tamper Protection: Ensure “Tamper Protection” is enabled on all endpoint security agents. This prevents the specific “service termination” commands Shanya sends from user-mode.
• Kernel Callback Monitoring: Advanced defenders should monitor for attempts to unregister kernel callbacks, a primary indicator of an active EDR killer trying to blind the system.

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